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GEORGE CARLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
SCHOLAR 
Christine A. Corcos • 
There are 400,000 words in the English language, and 
there are seven of 'em ya can't say on television. What a 
ratio that is. Three hundred and ninety-nine thousand 
nine hundred and ninety three to seven. They must really 
be bad.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court handed down its 1978 ruling in 
Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, :l it 
upheld the authority of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to regulate indecency on the public airwaves. Unfortu­
nately, the Court gave the agency relatively little guidance con­
cerning the definition of "indecency," a point that George Carlin 
made repeatedly during a 1973 monologue that, ironically 
enough, was the subject of the ruling. But a clear message that 
the Court did deliver to the FCC and to licensees was that Carlin 
had successfully identified seven words that the FCC could regu­
late on broadcast television and radio.:l 
• {" 2008. Christine A. Corcos. All rights reserved. Associate Professor of Law. Lou· 
isiana State University Law Center. Baton Rouge. Louisiana. I wish to thank Jonathan 
Entin. Associate Dean and Professor of Law and Political Science. Case Western Rest•rve 
University Law School. for the suggestion. made in passing during my law school days so 
many years ago. that George Carlin is a constitutional law scholar. I also wish to thank my 
colleagues Professor Lee Ann Lockridge and John Devlin for reading drafts of thi;: e;:say 
and for their valuable suggestions, and John Crigler. of Garvey Schubert Barer. Washing· 
ton. D.C .. for taking the time to discuss the George Carlin and Sarah Jones case;: with nw. 
Any errors or misstatements are my own. 
1. George Carlin. Seuen Words You Can M•tt<'r Say on Tt•l1•f'isio11. in Clas.� Clo1rn 
(Atlantic Recording Corp. J9i2) (CD). 
2. 4:l8 U.S. 726 (1978). 
:l. For a verbatim transcript ofC"nrlin'" monologu1>, SN' id. nt ii>l-·7iiii. 
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We have now lived with Pacifica and Carlin's insights for 
three decades.4 In this Article, the Author would like to make 
some suggestions concerning the importance of the points Carlin 
made in his monologue entitled Seven Filthy Words.5 Further, 
given the recent Second Circuit ruling in Fox Television Stations 
v. FCC,6 the Author urges the FCC to revisit its current indecency 
policy, which seems to have become increasingly unworkable. 
II. BASIS FOR AND HISTORY OF FCC REGULATION 
UNTIL THE PACIFICA RULING 
Before one can understand the importance of Carlin's obser­
vations and of the impact he had on subsequent media law, one 
should spend some time considering the history of FCC enforce­
ment actions. To start, it is worth noting the distinction between 
"obscenity" and "indecency." Two commentators, Keith Brown and 
Adam Candeub, have examined the historical meanings of "ob­
scenity" and "indecency." They suggested that the Court was in­
correct in ascribing separate meanings to the words "obscene" and 
"indecent" (as it did in Pacifica) for the following historical rea­
son:7 
[Doctor] Milagros Rivera-Sanchez suggests that the 1927 
Radio Act8 language was largely lifted from the Commerce 
Department pamphlet of 1914, Regulation 210 discussed 
above. The First Radio Conference produced a draft radio 
bill dated April 18, 1922; section 3(E)(e) of the document 
states that an operator's license shall be suspended if he 
4. George Carlin died from heart failure on June 22, 2008 in Santa Monica. Ed 
Payne, Award-Winning Comedian George Carlin Dies, http://us.cnn.com/2008/SHOWBIZ/ 
06/23/carlin.obit/index.html (June 23, 2008). He was 71. Id. Of the case which made him 
famous to generations of lawyers and law students, he said the following: '"So my name is 
a footnote in American legal history, which I am perversely proud of."' Id. He was wrong. 
His name was, and is, much more than a "footnote," as the Author hopes this Article dem­
onstrates. 
5. Carlin, infra n. 47. This monologue is sometimes entitled Seven Dirty Words; how­
ever, this Article will consistently use the title Seven Filthy Words. 
6. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). 
7. Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction, 
2005 BYU L. Rev. 1463, 1478 (2005). 
8. The 1927 Radio Act stood for the proposition that radio waves are public and thus 
private ownership of them was forbidden. Id. at 1474-1475. One could use these airwaves 
only with the government's permission. Id. at 1475. 
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"has transmitted superfluous signals, or signals containing 
profane or obscene words or language." This language ex­
actly matches the Commerce Department pamphlet. When 
Senator Clarence Dill introduced H.R. 9971, however, he 
"inverted the order of the terms profane and obscene and 
added the word 'indecent."' There is no stated reason why 
Senator Dill did this and thus very little one can conclude 
about the significance of the revision. This version with 
slight changes was adopted into the 1927 Act. This interest­
ing historical footnote suggests that the Pacifica opinion was 
probably incorrect in claiming that indecency and obscenity 
referred to different concepts. Certainly, there is no evidence 
that the statute's drafters thought the two words had dis­
tinct meanings. Rather, the evidence, slim as it is, suggests 
that the congressmen envisioned prohibitions on one unitary 
category of inappropriate speech.9 
901 
Brown and Candeub further discussed the legislative history of 
subsequent Acts, noting that Congress adopted the "obscenity, 
indecency, and profanity language" into the 1934 Communica­
tions Act with no change and then into the 1948 Criminal Code. 10 
Additionally, Brown and Candeub noted that until the 1960s 
the FCC brought very few indecency enforcement actions against 
broadcasters . 1 1  Indeed, the period itself, which was one of mani­
fest conformity, resulted in few complaints to the agency, and 
those complaints that did materialize ended in less-than­
categorical censures.12 Broadcasters themselves evinced no par­
ticular interest in challenging a status quo, 13 established by both 
9. Id. at 1478-1479 (citations omitted). 
10. Id. at 1479. "[The 1934 Communications Act] established the Federal Communica· 
tions Commission (FCC) and transferred authority over spectrum decisions from the [Fed· 
era! Radio Commission] (FRC) to the FCC." Id. The 1934 Communications Act appears 
generally within Title 47 of the United States Code, and the 1948 Criminal Code refers to 
the 1948 version of Title 18 of the United States Code. 
1 1 .  See id. at 1482-1483 (noting that the shift in broadcasting enforcement occurred in 
the 1960s). 
12 .  Id. 
13. Id. This period was also the heyday of the anti-Communist search within govern­
ment and business with which many media insiders participated wholeheartedly. See 
generally Edward Alwood, Dark Days in the Newsroom: McCarthyism Aimed at the Press 
(Temple U. Press 2007) (reviewing congressional investigations of communism and the 
press, previously undisclosed FBI files and interviews, and actions of publishers in protect· 
ing their economic interest to analyze the protections accorded under the First Amend­
ment); but see generally Thomas P. Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCar-
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the FCC and the National Association of Broadcasters, that 
seemed to reflect social sensibilities.14 
A shift in mores beginning in the early 1960s brought a con­
sequent increase in FCC enforcement actions.15 As broadcasters 
became more adventurous (perhaps to appease the growing com­
ponent of listening and viewing audiences, which showed more 
interest in what one might call "frisky" topics), the FCC re­
sponded to the complaints (about the language used) of those who 
disapproved of the shift toward such content.16 But while the lan-
thyism, and American Culture (Columbia U. Press 2003) (arguing that America became 
more tolerant and open through the media, notwithstanding McCarthyism). Note, how­
ever, that in other spheres, the media was challenging this "conformist" doctrine. See Jo­
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (reversing the state court's decision 
that sustained a state agency's refusal to issue a license for exhibition of a film on grounds 
that it was "sacrilegious"); see also Times Film Corp. u. Chi., 365 U.S. 43, 44-45 (1961) 
(dismissing the complaint of a film company that asserted the city's film-review board's 
requirement that all films be presented for examination was unconstitutional as a prior 
restraint under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). Although many in the movie 
industry believed that the industry's Production Code seal of approval was necessary for 
success, United Artists bucked the trend, and in 1953, it released Otto Preminger's The 
Moon Is Blue (which used the forbidden word "virgin") without the seal of approval. New 
Pictures, Time Mag. (July 6, 1953) (available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
article/0,9171,822872,00.html); The Moon Is Blue (United Artists 1953) (motion picture). It 
was clear not every person felt the same way about the movie's content: 
In spite of the published controversy over the decency of the filmed version of [The 
Moon Is Blue], which has been passed by the New York State censors but judged im­
proper by the industry's own code, this glib little tract on maidenly virtue opened 
here yesterday. And, unless our observers missed it, the pit didn't yawn nor the 
heavens fall. 
Bosley Crowther, ''The Moon Is Blue," Preminger's Film Version of Play, Opens at the Sut­
ton and Victoria, N.Y. Times (July 9, 1953) (available at http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/ 
review?res=9902E6DD173DE23BBC4153DFB1668388649EDE) (describing also the film's 
use of the taboo words "seduce" and "pregnant"). Three days later, Crowther gave an up­
date of the situation, noting that in spite of the industry's continued refusal to give the 
film a seal of approval, or perhaps because of it, the film was attracting large audiences. 
Bosley Crowther, Outside the Code: "The Moon Is Blue" Hits Snag On Screen, N.Y. Times 
(July 12, 1953). For more on the battle over the film, see Leonard J. Leff & Jerold L. Sim­
mons, The Dame in the Kimono, 196-209 (2d ed., U. Press Ky. 2001) (explaining the flaws 
of rating by tracing the Production Code and motion picture censorship up to the year 
2000). Leff and Simmons' book also reproduces the Motion Picture Production Code which 
went into effect in 1924. Id. at 285-300. ' 
14. The media, including broadcasters and the motion picture industry, made certain 
for years to report faithfully both to governmental and quasi-governmental bodies about 
its activities in fighting what might be considered objectionable portrayals on screen and 
airwaves. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1482-1483. For a copy of the code the industry 
used, see Motion Picture Assn. of Am., A Code to Govern the Making of Motion Pictures; the 
Reasons Supporting It and the Resolution for Uniform Interpretation (Wash. 1955). 
15. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1483. 
16. In 1964, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's denial of a license renewal to radio 
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guage used was suggestive, it was not, at least by Carlin's stan­
dards, indecent.17 That is, the language made reference to behav­
ior that raised images in the listeners' minds, which was in part 
what had gotten earlier satirists and commentators into trouble.1s 
By themselves, the words used might not necessarily be consid­
ered "bad words," but they were "coarse, vulgar, suggestive[,] or 
susceptible of indecent double meaning."19 As Carlin pointed out 
in his famous monologue (and as was recognized in its variations), 
the words have no meaning by themselves; these meanings are 
learned.2° Further, as commentator William A. Huston and others 
have noted, "in order for any word to have meaning, it must have 
an a priori meaning agreed upon by both parties. Hearing it again 
simply invokes this prior knowledge, or the memory of its mean­
ing."21 
station WDKD on the basis that the licensee had permitted indecent or offensive material 
to be broadcasted and/or that he had misrepresented facts to the FCC with regard to the 
broadcast of that material. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The pro­
gram involved what was generally known as the ''Uncle Charlie" or the "Charlie Walker" 
program, a radio show with radio personality Charlie Walker that was deemed indecent. 
Id. at 535-536. 
17. For a list of examples of radio personality Charlie Walker's "obscene" chatter, see 
dustbury.com, Stern Realities, http://www.dustbury.com/archives/002324.html (Feb. 29, 
2004). One example references a dog urinating on cars, which is certainly not indecent 
under Carlin's standard. Id. 
18.  Another example of Charlie Walker's "double meaning" language is the following 
witty remark: "Now I done got sick and tired of all you fools giving me the devil about what 
I said about ol' so and so. Listen to me. Any of y'all out there that don't like what I said, 
y'all can all come up here to this radio station, and just kiss my ass . .. it's tied up right 
here at the back of the station!" Id.; see also Robinson, 334 F.2d at 535 (referring to 
Walker's language as "suggestive" and having a "double meaning''). 
19 .  See Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Paul Gates, Abortion on the Air: Broadcasters and 
Indecent Political Advertising, 46 Fed. Commun. L.J. 267, 283 n. 87 (1993-1994) (discuss­
ing how the FCC never defined "indecency," but instead used these other words to describe 
its definition). 
20. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 752. 
2 1 .  William A. Huston, Under Color of Law: Obscenity vs. the First Amendment, 1 0  
NEXUS 75, 7 7  (2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis i n  original). This phrase "a priori mean­
ing'' signifies that the person attached the particular meaning previously. Id. For example, 
an obscene word to a person who speaks English is not given the same meaning as that 
obscene word to a person who cannot speak English or who has never heard the word 
previously. Id. Indeed, Huston discusses briefly the notion that obscenity might be a 
thought crime "if one accepts the aforementioned propositions [that words have an agreed­
upon meaning], and the utterance causes injury, how can one determine which utterance 
caused the injury? Since the injury derives from the stimulation of a memory, is obscenity 
in fact a thought crime?" Id. at 77-78. 
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By the early 1970s, while Richard Nixon served as president, 
the FCC was hot on the trail of "bad words."22 In 1970, the FCC 
fined Eastern Education Radio one hundred dollars over musician 
Jerry Garcia's use of the words "shit" and "fuck" although he used 
the words to emphasize a point and not in an "excretory" man­
ner.:?:1 The FCC, noting that the case was one of first impression,24 
maintained that both Title 18, Section 1464 of the United States 
Code and the licensee's public-interest requirement mandated 
that the licensee (and more specifically, the interviewers) should 
have cautioned Garcia to not use objectionable language.:.i5 The 
licensee had failed to do so.26 The FCC also noted that regardless 
of which requirement it applied to measure the behavior of the 
licensee, "the criteria for [its] action thus remains the same, in 
our view-namely. that the material be patently offensive and 
utterly without redeeming value."27 However, because the mate­
rial was broadcast over the public airwaves, the agency took the 
position that the standard could be less stringent for indecent and 
offensive material than it was for potentially obscene material 
available, for example. at the local bookstore. 
Two years later. the FCC pounced on Sonderling Broadcast­
ing for airing material that fit within the new popular "topless 
radio .. format. fining Sonderling's Oak Park, Illinois station two 
thousand dollars.is "Topless radio" consisted generally of discus-
22. Brown & Cnndeub. s11pra n. 7. at 1484. 
21. Id. The tTC's decision can be found at In Re WUHY·FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (19i0). 
:\tr. lrarcia was interviewed in hia hotel room. WUHY-FM. 24 F.C.C.2d at 408. The inter· 
,,ewers taped the converMtion and aired it the next night. Id. Mr. Garcia used phrases 
rlurinit the inteniew like "[shit! man" and "[pjolitical change is so [fucking] slow." Id. 
Id. 
24. n-c.:Hr-FM. 24 F.C.C.2d at 412. 
2.;. Id. at 414. The Commission suggested the following: 
[T]he station employees could have cautioned Mr. Garcia either at the outset or after 
the first few expres!lions to avoid using these "gratuitous" expressions; they did not 
clo so. That the material was presented without obtaining the station manager's ap­
proval-contrary to station policy-does not absolve the licensee of responsibility. 
26. Id. (de!!<'ribing the station's failure to caution Garcia to avoid further use of "gra­
tuitous" eitpressions as "gross negligence on the part of the licensee with respect to its 
supt•n·isory duties'). 
27. Id. The Commission noted that "in sensitive areas like this, the Commission can 
nppropriatl'ly act only in clear-cut, flagrant cases: doubtful or close cases are clearlv to he 
rt'>•olvecl in thi> licensee's favor." Id. (citations omitted). 
. 
:l�. Brown & Candeub. supra n. i. at 1484. The Sonderling opinion is available at Jn re 
So11cfrrli11Jl Uroad. Corp . .  41 F.C.C.2d iii (197:1). 
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sions of rather explicit sexual topics between masters of ceremo­
nies and callers.29 In seeking reconsideration of the FCC's deci­
sion to fine Sonderling, 30 two advocacy groups argued that the 
ruling caused a "chilling effect" that deprived listeners of "expo­
sure to speech and ideas about important issues, thereby abridg­
ing [complainants'] First Amendment rights to receive 'free 
speech by radio."'31 However, the Commission determined that 
the ruling did not have the feared "chilling effect" even though 
Sonderling had eliminated its sex-talk show. 32 It drew the distinc­
tion between offensive programming (which the FCC cannot pro­
hibit from the airwaves) and "obscene and indecent" programming 
(against which the FCC may take action under Title 18, Section 
1464 of the United States Code).33 Sonderling's sex show fell into 
the latter category.34 Further, the agency noted that the fact that 
children might have been in the audience was not the basis for its 
decision;35 rather, it had acted because of the "pervasive and in­
trusive nature" of the show. 36 
29. John C. Carlin, The Rise and Fall of Topless Radio, 26 J. Commun. 31, 31 (Winter 
1976). 
3 0. Sonderling maintained that it was not liable but nevertheless submitted to the 
fine. Sanderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d at 779. 
31. Id. at 780. The two advocacy groups were the Illinois Citizens Committee for 
Broadcasting and the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union. Id. at 777. 
The Petitioners offered the following examples of the "chilling effect": 
(1) Sonderling's cancellation of its sex-talk program; (2) Storer Broadcasting Com­
pany's reported change in the format of the "Bill Balance Show," the most widely 
heard of the sex-talk programs, whereby "intimate topics" will be forbidden; and 
(3) the [National Association of Broadcasters] resolution of March 27 condemning 
and deploring "tasteless and vulgar program content. " 
Id. at 780. 
3 2. Id. at 783. 
3 3. Id. at 784. 
3 4. Id. at 782. The Commission notes in its decision that 
we must be sensitive to allegations that our actions have forced licensees to abandon 
controversial programs which are not unlawful . .. Our Notice to Sanderling was 
prompted not by the fact that WGLD-FM had a sex-talk show; many other stations 
also had such programs and have not been assessed. We acted against Sanderling 
solely because the station had broadcast obscene and indecent language . .. .  
Id. a t  784. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. The agency continued to note that since the program in question was broad­
casted during the afternoon hours, its content could not possibly have been expected to 
reach only adults. Id. That the offensive content could reach children served to aggravate 
the offense. Id. 
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The agency was clearly establishing a policy that offensive 
language and offensive content were impermissible during the 
afternoon hours even if children were not in the audience.37 The 
FCC said the following about child listeners: 
We went on to point out, however, that children were "in the 
audience during these afternoon hours," and we cited evi­
dence which indicated that the program was "not intended 
solely for adults." From this, we concluded that "the pres­
ence of children in the broadcast audience makes this an a 
fortiori matter." The obvious intent of this reference to chil­
dren was to convey the conclusion that this material was 
unlawful, and that it was even more clearly unlawful when 
presented to an audience which included children.38 
The FCC disclaimed any ability to determine whether the statute 
under which it made its determinations was constitutional.39 But 
it did say that 
[o]ur application of the statute in the Sonderling case was 
precisely in line with the then[-]relevant Supreme Court de-
cisions on obscenity, as we read them ... , and consistent 
with the limited Commission precedent .... [T]he Supreme 
Court has decided a series of cases which we believe rein­
force our analysis.40 
Sonderling's refusal to challenge the FCC order in federal 
court ultimately proved to be devastating in terms of other broad­
casters' abilities to challenge similar or more broadly aimed or-
37. Id. 
38. Id. (emphasis in original). 
39. Id. at 781. The Commission noted that Congress created the statute at issue, and 
that the Commission was not vested with the power "to set aside enactments of Congress." 
Id. The Commission did give its opinion that the statute was indeed constitutional, and it 
supported this conclusion with the fact that Congress had previously adopted the sub­
stance of Section 1464 numerous times in the past. Id. The Commission pointed out that 
the language 
was adopted as part of the Radio Act of 1927 and again as part of the Communica­
tions Act of 1934, and it was reenacted in the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. In 
1960, Congress effectively reenacted the substance of 1464 when it incorporated the 
statute by reference in Section 503 of the Communications Act, the forfeiture stat­
ute. 
Id. at n. 13. 
40. Id. (citations omitted). 
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ders. 41 The FCC had moved quite quickly from declaring indecent 
the "useless" expletives that Jerry Garcia had uttered42 to declar­
ing indecent the content that Sanderling's licensee broadcasted.43 
The stage was set for the next clash between the agency and a 
broadcaster. It was to be a battle to determine whether the FCC 
would consider indecent language protected if it was accompanied 
by serious analysis or whether even that context would fail to pro­
tect licensees from sanctions. The test came with a 1973 broad­
cast in which George Carlin's monologue figured prominently.44 
III. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PACIFICA RULING 
George Carlin was a satirist, and one of his methods was us­
ing occasionally shocking language to get a reaction from his au­
dience. Before and after his Seven Filthy Words monologue, he 
had shown an interest in words-in society's use, overuse, or mis­
use of them and in society's reaction to them. Consider his analy­
sis of the ever-popular invitation to board an airplane: 
It starts at the gate: "We'd like to begin the boarding proc­
ess." Extra word. "Process." Not necessary. Boarding is suf­
ficient. "We'd like to begin the boarding." Simple. Tells the 
story. People add extra words when they want things to 
sound more important than they really are. "Boarding proc­
ess" sounds important. It isn't. It's just a group of people get­
ting on an airplane. 
To begin their boarding process, the airline announces 
they will preboard certain passengers. And I wonder, How 
can that be? How can people board before they board? This I 
gotta see. But before anything interesting can happen I'm 
told to get on the plane. "Sir, you can get on the plane now." 
And I think for a moment. "On the plane? No, my friends, 
not me. I'm not getting on the plane; I'm getting in the 
plane! Let Evel Knievel get on the plane, I'll be sitting inside 
in one of those little chairs. It seems less windy in there." 
41 .  E.g. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
42. See supra nn. 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing Jerry Garcia's case). 
43. See generally Sanderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (discussing the "topless 
radio" broadcasts). 
44. See infra nn. 49-B5 and accompanying text (discussing the start of the controversy 
and ensuing judicial battle regarding George Carlin's Seven Filthy Words). 
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Then they mention that it's a nonstop flight. Well, I 
must say I don't care for that sort of thing. Call me old­
fashioned, but I insist that my flight stop. Preferably at an 
airport. Somehow those sudden cornfield stops interfere with 
the flow of my day. And just about at this point, they tell me 
the flight has been delayed because of a change of equip­
ment. And deep down I'm thinking, ''broken plane!" 
Speaking of potential mishaps, here's a phrase that ap­
parently the airlines simply made up: near miss. They say 
that if two planes almost collide it's a near miss. Bullshit, 
my friend. It's a near hit! A collision is a near miss. 45 
Carlin introduced his Seven Filthy Words monologue and a 
variant, Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television, in the 
early 1970s and has since revised it several times.46 He performed 
it before audiences in theaters and it is available on CD.47 To 
some extent, one could plausibly accept his statement that his 
purpose in creating the Seven Filthy Words monologue was to de­
termine, as he said, "the curse words and the swear words, the 
cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not sup­
posed to say all the time .... "48 The "all the time" he speaks of 
includes using these words on the television or radio airwaves. 
On October 30, 1973, Paul Gorman's 2:00 p.m. program, 
"Lunchpail," which broadcasted in New York City on WBAI-FM, 
discussed and analyzed society's attitude toward the use of lan-
45. George Carlin, Airline Announcements: Part One, in Napalm & Silly Putty 12-13 
(1st ed., Hyperion 2001) (emphasis in original). 
46. Commentators speculate that Carlin created the monologue in the wake of the 
Sanderling decision to test the FCC's indecency policy. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730 (ex­
plaining that Carlin's monologue was part of a program that discussed contemporary soci­
ety's attitude toward language). 
47. George Carlin, Occupation: Foole (Atlantic Recording Corp. 2000) (originally re­
corded in 1973). 
48. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755 (transcribing the Seven Filthy Words monologue). 
This transcript does not match the recording on the CD available from the Pacifica Foun­
dation, which reproduces it with bleeps. FCC, F1V 024: George Carlin, Pacifica, and the 
FCC (Pacifica Radio Archives 2006) (CD) (copy on file with Author). What the CD seems to 
reproduce more closely matches the routine known as Seven Words You Can Never Say on 
Television from Carlin's 1972 CD, Class Clown. Carlin, supra n. 1. The Author spoke at 
length with Brian De Shozar of Pacifica on October 15, 2007. Telephone Interview with 
Brian De Shozar, Dir., Pacifica Archives (Oct. 15, 2007). He told her that the CD actually 
includes material from a live recording made at the Santa Monica Civic Auditorium in 
1977. Id. Since no live recording seems to exist of the original 1973 broadcast, Pacifica 
Foundation reconstructed a broadcast using tapes available from its archives. Id. 
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guage.49 As "an incisive satirical view of the subject under discus­
sion,"50 Gorman played a broadcast, which closely resembled 
Carlin's monologue from the album Occupation: Foole.51 Immedi­
ately prior to the broadcast of the monologue, listeners were ad­
vised that it included language that some might regard as offen­
sive and that those who might be offended should change stations 
and turn back in fifteen minutes. 52 
Approximately one month after the broadcast, the FCC re­
ceived a complaint from John H. Douglas, a man in New York 
City who heard Gorman's October 30 program while driving in his 
car.53 Douglas, a minister and a board member of Morality in Me­
dia, 54 complained that his "young son"55 was with him and had 
49. In re Citizen's Comp[. against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 
95 ( 1975). 
50. Id. 
51 .  The content of this monologue seems to have been essentially equivalent to the 
Seven Filthy Words monologue although it may have crucially differed in some major re­
spects. See infra nn. 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing differences between the 
monologues). The WBAI host played a portion of the Occupation: Foote album. Pacifica 
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 1 1  (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). But in many 
instances, radio stations did not keep records of what they broadcast, so Pacifica recon­
structed the broadcast. Supra n. 48. Comedians' routines change often, so although the 
1973 Occupation: Foote version of the monologue was broadcast that day, it differs from 
other versions of the same sketch-the words may change, but the nature of it stays the 
same. 
52. Br. of Respt. at 3, FCC v. Pacifica Found. Station, 438 U.S. 726 (1973). 
53. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95. 
54. Huston, supra n. 21 ,  at 81 n. 45. Morality in Media is a lobbying organization 
founded in 1962 to protect children and the community by combating child pornography as 
well as other indecencies seen in various forms of media. Morality in Media, Inc., Home 
Page, http://www.moralityinmedia.org (accessed Apr. 27, 2008). 
55. According to an article by Robert Corn-Revere, Douglas' son was fifteen. Robert 
Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery: Exon vs. the Internet, CATO Policy Analysis No. 232, 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-232.html (June 28, 1995). Mr. Corn-Revere was lead 
counsel for CBS in the recent case of Fox Television Stations v. FCC in the Second Circuit. 
See Fox TV Station v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 445 (2d Cir. 2007). According to William A. 
Huston, the boy's age was twelve. Huston, supra n. 21,  at 8 1  n. 45 (citing Ltr. from John H. 
Douglas to FCC Enforcement Bureau, Letter of Complaint (Nov. 28, 1973)). University of 
Texas Law Professor Lucas A. Powe suggested that Mr. Douglas' description of his son as 
"young" rather than as a teenager (if, indeed, the son was a teenager) was part of Morality 
in Media's agenda to draw the agency's attention to what it considered the growing prob­
lem of indecency on the airwaves, which it thought the FCC was ignoring. Lucas A. Powe, 
Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment 1 86 (U. Cal. Press 1987). If Mr. 
Douglas' son were indeed fifteen, he certainly must have already been exposed to four­
letter words. Id. Powe hypothesized further that it is unlikely that Mr. Douglas, who cer­
tainly would not qualify as a typical Pacifica listener, actually heard the show of which he 
complained. Id. Powe noted finally that the FCC did not take immediate action on the 
complaint, waiting nearly a full year before commencing action. Id. at 186. This might 
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d h " k k ""f k "" t "". "" th heard wor s sue as coc sue er, uc , cun , piss, mo er-
fucker," and "shit" used on public airwaves.56 Mr. Douglas stated 
that "[t]his was supposed to be part of a comedy monologue" and 
that "[a]ny child could have been turning the dial, and tuned in to 
that garbage."57 
In response to Mr. Douglas' complaint, the licensee stated the 
following: 
George Carlin is a significant social satirist of American 
manners and language in the tradition of Mark Twain and 
Mort Sahl. Like Twain, Carlin finds his material in our most 
ordinary habits and language-particularly those "secret" 
manners and words which, when held before us for the first 
time, show us new images of ourselves .... Carlin is not 
mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as 
harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those 
words. 
As with other great satirists-from Jonathan Swift to 
Mort Sahl-George Carlin often grabs our attention by 
speaking the unspeakable, by shocking in order to illumi­
nate. Because he is a true artist in his field, we are of the 
opinion that the inclusion of the material broadcast in a pro­
gram devoted to an analysis of the use of language in con­
temporary society was natural and contributed to a further 
understanding on the subject. 58 
After receiving the licensee's response, the FCC noted that 
the Communications Act, which "prohibited the [FCC] from en­
gaging in censorship or interfering 'with the right of free speech 
by means of radio communication,"' was originally under Section 
indicate, according to Powe, that the agency was waiting for a resolution in the pending 
Sonderling case. Id. at 186-187 (discussing the case and "topless radio"). Sanderling did 
not appeal, but some Illinois citizens, concerned about the "chilling effect" of the sanction, 
filed suit on behalf of the station. See id. at 185 (citing Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. 
FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (1974)) (discussing a citizens' group intervention to appeal the Sonder­
ling decision). 
56. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 96. In an interview on Pacifica's From the Vault CD, Mr. Gorman seems to 
suggest that he did not originally intend to play the Carlin excerpt. FCC, supra n. 48. 
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326 and subsequently transferred to Section 1464 of Title 18 of 
the United States Code.59 
The following is part of Carlin's Seven Filthy Words mono­
logue in which he critiqued the FCC's policy by using some of the 
words he thought the agency would ban. 60 He explained, admit­
tedly using less elegant language than would an attorney, why he 
believed such a policy is flawed: 
Aruba-du, ruba-tu, ruba-tu. I was thinking about the curse 
words and the swear words, the cuss words and the words 
that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the 
time, [']cause words or people into words want to hear your 
words. Some guys like to record your words and sell them 
back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on the telephone, 
write down what words you say .... Okay, I was thinking 
one night about the words you couldn't say on the public, ah, 
airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever .... 
And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I have 
to figure out which ones you couldn't and ever and it came 
down to seven but the list is open to amendment .... The 
original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, 
motherfucker, and tits.61 Those are the ones that will curve 
your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, 
even bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) 
um, and a bourbon. (laughter) And now the first thing that 
we noticed was that word fuck was really repeated in there 
because the word motherfucker is a compound word and it's 
another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You want to be a 
purist it doesn't really-it can't be on the list of basic words. 
Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that 
is really dirty. The word-the half sucker that's merely sug­
gestive (laughter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty 
59. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C. C.2d at 96. 
60. The following monologue is reproduced exactly as it was printed in the Pacifica 
opinion. 
61. Currently, the F C C  restricts obscene material from radio and television broadcasts 
completely. F C C, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity, Frequently Asked Questions, "What Is 
the Safe Harbor?," http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html (updated Apr. 27, 2 0 07). However, 
from 10 p.m. through 6 a.m. radio and television stations may broadcast indecent material. 
Id. The F C C  defines indecent speech as "material that, in context, depicts or describes 
sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive as measured by con­
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium." Lili Levi, First Report: The 
FCC's Regulation of Indecency 2-3 (First Amend. Ctr. Aug. 6, 2 0 07) (available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/FirstReport.Indecency.Levi.pdf). 
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word, 50% dirty-dirty half the time, depending on what you 
mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember when you first heard it, 
like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the cock crowed 
three times, heh (laughter) the cock-three times. It's in the 
Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you 
heard about a cock-fight, remember-What? Huh? naw. It 
ain't that, are you stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's 
chickens, you know, (laughter) Then you have the four letter 
words from the old [Anglo]-Saxon fame. Uh, shit and fuck. 
The word shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in that the 
middle class has never really accepted it and approved it. 
They use it like, crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a 
rude, dirty, old kind of gushy word. (laughter) They don't 
like that, but they say it, like, they say it like, a lady now in 
a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the time she says it 
as an expletive, you know, it's out of her mouth before she 
knows .... I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album. 
Isn't that groovy? ... That's true . . . [']cause (laughter) 
that's based on people liking it man .... Ha! So! Now the 
word shit is okay for the man. At work you can say it like 
crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get that shit out of here, will ya? 
I don't want to see that shit anymore. I can't cut that shit, 
buddy. I've had that shit up to here. I think you're full of shit 
myself . ... The big one, the word fuck that's the one that 
hangs them up the most. [']Cause in a lot of cases that's the 
very act that hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that 
the word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word, 
fuck. nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to 
say. One syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You 
know, it's easy. Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a 
kuh. Right? (laughter) A little something for everyone. Fuck 
(laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud word, too. Who are 
you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN. 
(laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE 
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting word too, [']cause 
it's got a double kind of a life-personality-dual, you know, 
whatever the right phrase is. It leads a double life, the word 
fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the time, 
fuck. What does it mean? It means to make love. Right? 
We're going to make love, yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're 
going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're 
really going to fuck, yeah, we're going to make love. Right? 
And it also means the beginning of life, it's the act that be­
gins life, so there's the word hanging around with words like 
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love, and life, and yet on the other hand, it's also a word that 
we really use to hurt each other with, man. It's a heavy. It's 
one that you have toward the end of the argument. (laugh­
ter) Right? (laughter) You finally can't make out. Oh, fuck 
you man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck. 
(laughter) Fuck you and everybody that looks like you. 
(laughter) man. It would be nice to change the movies that 
we already have and substitute the word fuck for the word 
kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches 
would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop 
me before I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck 
the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch 
Bill, you'll fuck that engine again. (laughter) ... The addi­
tions to the list. I found three more words that had to be put 
on the list of words you could never say on television, and 
they were fart, turd and twat, those three. (laughter) Fart, 
we talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a cutie word, 
no problem. Turd, you can't say but who wants to, you know? 
(laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm 
not worried about that one. Now the word twat is an inter­
esting word. Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is 
an interesting word because it's the only one I know of, the 
only slang word applying to the, a part of the sexual anat­
omy that doesn't have another meaning to it. Like, ah, 
snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even 
in a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going to snatch 
that pussy and put him in a box and bring him on the air­
plane. (murmur, laughter) Everybody loves it. The twat 
stands alone, man, as it should. And two-way words. Ah, ass 
is okay providing you're riding into town on a religious feast 
day. (laughter) You can't say, up your ass. (laughter) You 
can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can 
say its weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, 
uh, want to, ah, thank you for listening to my words, man, 
fellow, uh space travelers. Thank you man for tonight and 
thank you also. (clapping whistling)62 
913 
In this monologue, Carlin pointed out that some words are on the 
list because they suggest certain behaviors as well as indecency. 
Others appear on the list, even if they are by themselves not inde-
62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755. The transcript provided by the FCC is appended to 
the Pacifica opinion. 
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cent, because when compounded with other words they take on 
indecent meanings (the best example of this type of compound 
word is "motherfucker") . Still others appear even though they are 
generally accepted in other contexts-for example, in the work­
place or used accidentally-which suggests that the indecency 
rules are not general standards, but instead are standards that a 
minority applies to the majority. Carlin also pointed out that 
some words cannot be spoken on the radio even though the words 
appear in great literature (the Bible, for example, uses the word 
"cock") .63 He also noted that some words may or may not be ac­
ceptable depending upon how the word is being used and its 
meaning (the "ass" reference) . But the objection to sexually sug­
gestive language is odd, he said, since violence is so pervasive, 
and yet so many people seem not to object to it. Sports metaphors 
are particularly violent and quite prevalent on the radio. Yet 
those seem to offend people to a far lesser degree than the "dirty 
words." His satirical suggestion that we replace the word "kill" 
with the word "fuck" only makes this point more clear.64 Lawyers 
have made such literacy arguments with varying degrees of suc­
cess, but none, the Author would suggest, as vividly as Carlin.65 
63. E.g. Mark 14:30 (King James) (using the word in the context of a chicken as fol­
lows: "And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto thee, That this day, even in this night, 
before the cock crow twice, though shalt deny me thrice"). 
64. See Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 7 1 1  (2007) (discussing the 
treatment of the word "fuck" in legal jurisprudence). 
65. See John Crigler, In re KBOO Foundation, Response to Notice of Apparent Liability 
for Forfeiture, http://www.gsblaw.com!resource/pub_result.asp?ID=l 7261 4792001 (July 6, 
2001) (attaching Sarah Jones' song Your Revolution to the brief filed on behalf of the radio 
station to show that the context of the song could change the meaning). The FCC told 
Portland, Oregon radio station KBOO that it was in violation of FCC rules against inde­
cency for playing Jones' song. Id. Lawyers for the station argued that the piece was a cri­
tique of society, that the FCC could not reasonably divorce its lyrics from the music, and 
that the FCC should consider the airing of the song in the context of the program, an ar­
gument which had failed in Pacifica. Id. In addition, attorney John Crigler noted that the 
FCC failed to consider the context in which Jones used the allegedly impermissible words. 
Id. Crigler further argued that 
[w] hen indecency, "which is largely a function of context," [Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742) 
is stripped of any thoughtful consideration of context, enforcement of the Commis­
sion's indecency standard becomes prohibited censorship . . . .  The Commission im­
poses fines not because a broadcaster unreasonably concluded that material satisfies 
indecency standards, but solely because the material contains "sexual references" 
that are "similar" to references in prior Commission rulings. Sealed off from any vi­
tal considerations of context[-]the views of the artist, the audience, the station, the 
programmer and local educators[-]Commission rulings thus mechanically perpetu­
ate themselves. "Offensiveness" is measured not by reference to "contemporary" 
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In the FCC ruling on the complaint, Commissioner Glen Rob­
inson's concurring statement, which Commissioner Benjamin 
Hooks joined, illustrates the kind of thinking that Carlin criti­
cized. 66 Robinson wrote in his concurrence that 
[o)n reading George Carlin's monologue, my first instinct 
was to affirm his opinion that these were indeed words "you 
couldn't say on the public . . .  airwaves." Reflection pushed 
me to the opposite extreme: proper respect for the principles 
of free speech and of noninterference by government in mat­
ters of public decency and decorum commands us to reject 
Carlin's opinion and accept that of Pacifica. On still further 
reflection, I am led to conclude, along with my colleagues, 
that even a rigorous respect for the principles of free speech 
and government non-intervention permits some accommoda­
tion to the demands of decency. 67 
Commissioner Robinson continued, 
I initially had some difficulty with the idea that "literary, ar­
tistic, political[,] or scientific value" could constitute a de­
fense to allegedly indecent language at one time of the day 
but not at another. I have concurred in this rule, however, 
because I understand it simply to carry forward an aspect of 
the "nuisance" idea . . . .  68 
In the same breath, Commissioner Robinson asserted that 
indecency "is not a property of language, but arises when dirty 
words are uttered at inappropriate times or in inappropriate cir­
cumstances."69 If he did not think that indecency was a "property 
standards but by rulings that indicate only what has offended FCC officials in the 
past. "Standards for the broadcast medium" are. in fact. not standards at all .  for the 
Commission rejects all proffered evidence concerning such standards and bases its 
rulings solely on its views of offensiveness and its view of merit. To punish a station 
for the broadcast of officially disfavored subject matter is the essence of governmen· 
tal censorship. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Jones also filed suit against the FCC: although a court dis­
missed the suit, the agency reversed itself and found that the broadcast of the song was 
not indecent. In re K.BOO Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, http://hraunfoss 
.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-03·469Al .pdf (Feb. 20. 2003). 
66. Citizen 's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 103. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 108 n. 9. 
69. Id. 
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of language," he could have referred to the words in question sim­
ply as "words" and not as "dirty words." He could have discussed 
uttering them in "certain circumstances," rather than in "inap­
propriate circumstances." The pejorative word "inappropriate" 
indicates the degree to which the Commissioner was disinclined 
to find in Pacifica's favor: 
Demonstrating that children are not unsupervised in 
the audience because of the late hour changes the context, 
and correlatively it changes the balance to be struck among 
the competing values, and whether particular language 
ought to be regarded as illegal or not. 
On the issue of artistic value as a defense, one further 
point should be mentioned. Pacifica's comparison of Carlin 
with Mark Twain strikes me personally as being a bit 
jejuene. But no one should suppose that an author must be a 
giant of letters in order to receive protection for works which 
have "serious literary [or] artistic ... value." The Constitu­
tion protects lesser literary lights as well as those with the 
artistic candlepower of Mark Twain. If I were called on to do 
so, I would find that Carlin's monologue, if it were broadcast 
at an appropriate hour and accompanied by suitable warn­
ing, was distinguished by sufficient literary value to avoid 
being "indecent" within the meaning of the statute.70 
The balancing test proposed here still rests on the notion that 
Carlin's speech is a "nuisance" that must be channeled to a more 
appropriate time of day because its literary value is less than that 
of the "giant of letters" to whom the Commissioner here compares 
its author. 71 The suggestion is still that whatever "literacy value" 
Carlin's monologue contains shines forth only from behind the 
70. Id. (alteration in original) . 
71.  Id. That the FCC Commissioners were not as sympathetic to Carlin's viewpoint as 
the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit is obvious from the following excerpt of the 
Commission's majority opinion: 
Carlin's use of the "dirty words" was designed in part to demonstrate that they have 
acquired many popular meanings, apart from their literal meanings. For example, 
the phrase "I'm shit-faced" has nothing to do with an excretory activity or organ. It 
means, "I am drunk." The irony of the Order is that non-"obnoxious" synonyms for 
the dirty words (such as "feces" for "shit") are not banned even though such syno­
nyms are only understood in their literal, "obnoxious sense." 
Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d at 23 n. 1 7  (Brazelon, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
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barricade o f  an "appropriate hour" and a "suitable warning." All 
in all, even though Robinson suggested that he was making no 
value judgments, value judgments were clearly at play. 
Pacifica successfully appealed the unfavorable ruling to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit.72 The FCC subsequently appealed the case to the Supreme 
Court. 
In eventually upholding the FCC's initial ruling and revers­
ing the District of Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court applied a 
similar balancing test73 and recognized that Carlin's speech as 
broadcasted on Gorman's "Lunchpail" program was "vulgar, of­
fensive, and shocking."74 The Court seemed to recognize that 
whatever social value came from Pacifica's broadcast that after­
noon was "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality."75 This balance suggests that speech from something of 
a proportionately higher "social interest" might be protected at 
2:00 p.m. even if it contained the same type of language as 
Carlin's monologue.76 
The Court then clarified the narrowness of its holding by 
stating that "[t]his case does not involve a two-way radio conver­
sation between a cab driver and a dispatcher[ ] or a telecast of an 
Elizabethan comedy."77 Notice the differences in the types of 
speech here. The two-way conversation might not normally be 
accessible to children. Both its purpose and its method of commu­
nication would tend to ensure that children are not in the audi­
ence. The Elizabethan comedy, like the Pacifica broadcast that 
afternoon, might easily be accessible to children.78 However, the 
72. Id. at 10. 
73. See id. at 750 (listing the following variables to be considered in evaluating the 
context of the broadcast: time of day, program content, and type of broadcast media). 
74. Id. at 747. 
75. Id. at 746. 
76. See id. at 750 (distinguishing Carlin's monologue from an Elizabethan comedy). 
77. Id. 
78. Youth-oriented Shakespeare festivals can be found throughout the United States 
and England. E.g. Folger Shakespeare Lib. ,  Children's Shakespeare Festival, http://www 
.folger.edu/template.cfm?cid=607 (accessed June 13, 2008); U. Pitt., Department of Theatre 
Arts, Shakespeare-in-the-Schools, About Us, http://www.play.pitt.edu/sits/about.html (up­
dated Oct. 24, 2007); Shakespeare Schs. Festival, Shakespeare Schools Festival, Festival 
History, http://www.ssf.uk.com/aboutus/festivalhistory (accessed June 13, 2008). 
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Court automatically seems to assume that the dramatic work has 
more value than Carlin's satire.79 
Both the FCC ruling and the Supreme Court opinion sidestep 
(although they certainly do not miss) Carlin's point in the mono­
logue, which was that there was no list specifying words that the 
government forbade broadcasters, or anyone else, to say. The 
modern speaker is not on notice. In other words, a broadcaster 
proceeded at its own risk when using controversial language be­
cause there was no government list specifying what language 
could and could not result in a sanction. It was only after the 
broadcaster used the controversial words (and a listener subse­
quently filed a complaint) that the FCC provided a ruling that the 
language was unacceptable.8° Carlin's list has both a satirical and 
a practical purpose. He meant to poke fun at the FCC, but he also 
wanted to assist others by pointing out what words are dangerous 
and that the danger lies in perceptions that change over time. The 
word that is considered filthy and unacceptable today could be 
considered acceptable tomorrow. 81 
The Supreme Court's majority opinion does not confront the 
First Amendment defense seriously, but instead frames the issue 
as one in which it is required to "decide whether the Federal Com­
munications Commission has any power to regulate a radio 
broadcast that is indecent but not obscene."82 The FCC defended 
its rationale by linking 
the concept of "indecent" ... [to] the exposure of children to 
language that describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the 
79. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (distinguishing Carlin's monologue from a telecast 
Elizabethan comedy without any support for that distinction). 
80. See supra nn. 15-44 and accompanying text (describing cases prior to Pacifica 
where the FCC sanctioned radio stations for "indecent" double entendres and "topless 
radio" programs). 
81 .  A word's unacceptability lies as much in the context in which one speaks as in the 
word itself. Thus, the bawdy words that are now acceptable when spoken by an actor in an 
Elizabethan comedy are acceptable precisely because a modern audience does not under· 
stand them. For more about the Elizabethan comedy, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (dis· 
cussing the Elizabethan comedy compared with Carlin's monologue) . If the audience does 
not understand the language, as in the Elizabethan comedy example, why should the 
words be more acceptable than when the audience does understand them, as in the Carlin 
monologue example? 
82. Id. at 729. Note that this is the opening sentence of Justice Stevens' majority opin­
ion. Id. 
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broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, 
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that chil­
dren may be in the audience.83 
9 1 9  
Rather than limit the construction of Section 1464 to obscene lan­
guage, as Pacifica urged, the Court accepted the FCC's interpre­
tation.84 Thus, the Court accepted the distinction between "inde­
cency" and "obscenity," noting that, as used in the statute, the 
terms are disjunctive.85 Consequently, it did not accept Pacifica's 
notion that "prurient appeal" need be a component of indecent 
language.86 While "prurient appeal" is a component of the obscen­
ity test, in the Court's view it is not part of the FCC's indecency 
regime.87 Finally, the Court rejected Pacifica's constitutional ar­
gument that the FCC's order was overbroad88 and that Carlin's 
monologue was not obscene.89 
To address Pacifica's argument that the monologue was not 
obscene, the question of the actual content of Carlin's monologue 
might have been important if the routine Seven Words You Can 
Never Say on Television had been broadcast. Instead, WBAI chose 
to broadcast the routine Seven Filthy Words from the LP Occupa­
tion: Foole, released in 1973,90 instead of the routine Seven Words 
You Can Never Say on Television, released in 1972.91 Carlin's 
message in these two routines is essentially the same. The intro­
ductions to the routines, however, differ. 
83. Id. at 731-732 (quoting Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98) (cita­
tion omitted). 
84. Id. at 74 1 .  There was no basis for disagreeing with the FCC's conclusion that the 
broadcast involved "indecent" language. Id. 
85. Id. at 740; see supra nn. 7-10 and accompanying text (describing the statutory 
history of the terms "obscenity" and "indecency"). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. The Court rejected the argument that the order was 
overbroad because it "was issued in a specific factual context" and that the Court's review 
is limited to "this particular broadcast." Id. 
89. See id. at 742, 744-751 (identifying Pacifica's argument and describing the reasons 
for rejecting it). First, the Court noted that offensive content was not entitled to absolute 
constitutional protection and that its context must be considered. Id. at 747-748. The 
Court went on to justify the FCC's ability to regulate the "undisputed[ly] . . .  'vulgar,' 'of· 
fensive,' and 'shocking"' monologue on the grounds that broadcasting is "uniquely perva­
sive . . .  in the lives of all Americans" and is "uniquely accessible to children . . . . " Id. at 
748-749. 
90. Citizen 's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95. 
9 1 .  Carlin, supra n. 1. 
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The following is the Author's transcript of the introduction to 
the Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television routine. It dif­
fers considerably from the FCC-provided transcript,92 and it in­
cludes commentary that might have lifted Carlin's broadcast from 
the "unredeeming" into, perhaps, the redeemable. 
I wanna tell you something about words that I think is im­
portant. I love, as I say, they're my work, they're my play, 
they're my passion. Words are all we have really. We have 
thoughts, but thoughts are fluid . . .  and then we assign a 
word to a thought and we're stuck with that word, for that 
thought, so be careful with words. I like to think, yeah the 
same words, you know, that hurt can heal, it's a, it's a mat­
ter of how you pick them. There are some people that aren't 
into all the words, there are some people who would have 
you not use certain words . . .  yeah, there are four hundred 
thousand words in the English language and there are seven 
of 'em ya can't say on television. What a ratio that is. Three 
hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety 
three to seven. They must really be bad. They'd have to be 
OUTRAGEOUS to be separated from a group that large. All 
of you over here-you seven-bad words. That's what they 
told us they were, remember. That's a BAD WORD. No bad 
words. Bad thoughts, bad intentions, and words . You know 
the seven, don't you, that you can't say on television-shit, 
piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those 
are the heayy seven. Those are the ones that'll infect your 
soul, curve your spine and keep the country from winning 
the war. Shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, 
and tits. Wow. And tits doesn't even belong on the list, you 
know. Man. That's such a friendly sounding word. Sounds 
like a nickname.93 
These differences, however, may be moot. Even if WBAI had 
broadcast the Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television rou­
tine, one cannot be certain that the FCC would not have still 
92. See supra nn. 60-62 and accompanying text (quoting the FCC-provided transcript 
of Seven Filthy Words). 
93. Carlin, supra n. 1. Pacifica Foundation provides this CD as a representation of the 
original broadcast years later. It bleeps the words apparently because after the Supreme 
Court decided the case, licensees were prohibited from broadcasting them. Note, however, 
that one may purchase the George Carlin CDs and thus can obtain the recorded uncen­
sored monologues. 
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found the list of words offensive simply because the FCC probably 
still would have received at least one complaint and it would very 
likely have acted upon that complaint. Since the words in the list 
are the same, Carlin's explanation-the words represent pro­
tected thoughts, they are few in number, and they are not "outra­
geous"-would not have been likely to head off the FCC's action. 
Nevertheless, by limiting its review to whether the agency 
could "proscribe this particular broadcast," the Court sidestepped 
the question of constitutionality.94 Evaluating the approach in a 
fact-specific way is "appropriate for courts as well as the Commis­
sion when regulation of indecency is at stake, for indecency is 
largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in 
the abstract."95 The problem with this approach is that, with re­
gard to the content of Carlin's monologue, context matters a great 
deal. And context was part of Carlin's point. He linked form to 
content, and both to context. 
The Court said its approach was not inconsistent with the 
approach it took in Red Lion Broadcast Company v. FCC,96 where 
it held the FCC could impose the fairness doctrine on broadcast­
ers. 97 The fairness doctrine required that broadcasters discussing 
public issues give each side of the issue fair treatment.98 The Red 
Lion Court made its ruling despite criticism that forcing broad­
casters to present fair coverage of an issue would cause some 
broadcasters to stop airing discussions of important social is­
sues. 99 The Pacifica Court noted that, like Red Lion, its decision 
may lead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At most, 
however the Commission's definition of indecency will deter ' 
only the broadcasting of patently offensive references . . . .  
94. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. 
95.  Id. 
96. 395 U.S. 367 ( 1 969). 
97. Id. at 369. 
98. Id. Broadcasters challenged this rule, arguing that the First Amendment protected 
their right to "use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they 
choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency." Id. at 386. 
The Court rejected that argument, holding that the scarcity of broadcast frequencies re­
quired the government to protect access to those frequencies. Id. at 40H01 .  The FCC 
abandoned the fairness doctrine in 1987, however, after determining that it was no longer 
in the public interest. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 
1 989) (upholding the FCC's decision to discard the fairness doctrine). 
99. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743. 
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While some of these references may be protected, they surely 
lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern . . . .  The 
danger dismissed so summarily in Red Lion . . .  was that 
broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regula­
tions by refusing to present programs dealing with impor­
tant social and political controversies. Invalidating any rule 
on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not 
before the Court is "strong medicine" to be applied "spar­
ingly and only as a last resort."100 
But this is exactly what Pacifica does, assuming that what the 
FCC's rule does is chill only patently offensive references that 
have little or no social value101 based on the majority's assessment 
of the worth of Carlin's monologue. 102 Since Carlin's monologue is 
the proxy for all these "patently offensive references,"103 it is im­
portant to further examine the Court's analysis of the monologue.  
The opinion continued to explain that if  the government has 
"any power to restrict the public broadcast" of this kind of lan­
guage, "this was an appropriate occasion for its exercise."104 Al­
though Carlin's monologue was speech and "the Commission's 
objections to the broadcast were based in part on its content,"105 
the majority accepted the FCC's proposition that such obj ections 
are not fatal to regulation under the First Amendment. In fact, 
the Court accepted that, in other contexts, this monologue would 
be protected. 106 Why not in this context? Because it was delivered 
over the regulated airwaves, 107 because it entered homes unin-
100. Id. at 743-744 (citations omitted). 
1 0 1 .  See id. at 743 (stating that "[a]t most . . .  the Commission's definition of indecency 
will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references"). The Court's support for 
this conclusion is that "[a) requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its 
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication." Id. at 743 
n. 18. 
102. See id. at 743 (declining to protect "patently offensive sexual and excretory 
speech"); id. at 750-751 (analogizing the monologue to a "pig''). 
103. Id. at 7 43. 
104. Id. at 7 44. 
105. Id. 
106. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746. 
107. Id. at 748. The Court noted that the FCC may deny a broadcaster its license if it 
"would serve 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity."' Id. (citing FCC v. WOKO, 
Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946)). This is in contrast, the Court reasoned, with licensing other 
types of speakers, which requires "laws that carefully define and narrow official discre­
tion . . . . " Id. (construing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1 969); Staub 
v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313  ( 1 958)). 
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vited, 1 08 and because it was (and is) "uniquely pervasive,"109 an­
swered the Court. Anyone with a license to broadcast over a pub­
licly regulated radio frequency has a responsibility to listeners. Ho 
Consequently, 
[p] atently offensive, indecent material presented over the 
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in 
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be 
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of 
an intruder. 1 1 1  
For the Court, Pacifica's argument that form and content are nec­
essarily intertwined is untenable: 
If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's 
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could 
be traced to its political content-or even to the fact that it 
satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words­
First Amendment protection might be required. But that is 
simply not this case . 1 12 
The Court continued: 
The monologue does present a point of view; it attempts to 
show that the words it uses are "harmless" and that our atti­
tudes toward them are "essentially silly." The Commission 
108. See id. at 748-749 (analogizing unexpected radio content to a physical blow or an 
obscene phone call). The Court suggested that broadcasters cannot use warnings to protect 
its audience from exposure to unexpected program content because listeners frequently 
tune in and out of programs that are already in progress. Id. at 748. The Court also re­
jected the idea that a listener unexpectedly exposed to obscene content can address the 
situation by turning off the radio. Id. This, the Court reasoned, would be like telling an 
assault victim that her remedy is to run away after receiving the initial blow. Id. at 748-
749. The Court noted that "[o]ne may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option 
does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken 
place." Id. at 749 (citation omitted). 
109. Id. at 748. The Court's justification can be found in the text accompanying infra 
note 1 1 3. 
1 10. See generally In re Compls. against Various Broad. Licenses regarding the Airing 
of the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4994 (1 994) [hereinafter Golden 
Globe Awards] (Adelstein, Commr., issuing separate statement) (concluding that 
"[b]roadcasters . . .  bear much of the responsibility to keep our airwaves decent" and that 
they are "stewards of the public airwaves"). 
l l l . Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (citing Rowan u. U.S. Post Off. Dept. , 397 U.S. 728, 738 
(1970)). 
1 12 .  Id. at 746 (citation omitted). 
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objects, not to this point of view, but to the way in which it is 
expressed. The belief that these words are harmless does not 
necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them 
while proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is 
harmless does not license one to communicate that convic­
tion by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaf­
let.113 
But satire is precisely this case. Carlin was critiquing contempo­
rary attitudes about four-letter words. The question of whether 
they should receive First Amendment protection is exactly what 
is at issue here. It deserves more consideration than it in fact re­
ceives. 
In much satire, as well as in parody, form is linked to content, 
but that fact does not preclude its protection under the First 
Amendment. 114 To dismiss the First Amendment argument so 
quickly without examining it more closely gives weight to the sus­
picion that the Court simply does not want to recognize the le­
gitimacy of opposition to the FCC's indecency policy or to the no­
tion that the point of view and the way it is expressed in this par­
ticular case cannot be divorced. 
N. CRITICISM OF THE PACIFICA DECISION 
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that " [a] re ­
quirement that indecent language be avoided will have its pri­
mary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious com­
munication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be ex­
pressed by the use of less offensive language."115 Justice Stevens 
is, of course, correct. If one's sole purpose is to express thought, 
what the FCC terms "decent" language may be perfectly ade­
quate. But the difference in image and impact between "decent" 
and "indecent" language may be the difference between a clinical 
description and a vivid and visceral one or between a piece of me-
113.  Id. at 746 n. 22 (internal cross-reference omitted). 
1 14. See generally Campbell u. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-581 (1994) 
(reasoning that parody necessarily mimics the content of another work and that "parody 
often shades into satire") ; Jordan M. Blanke, Victor's Little Secret: Supreme Court Decision 
Means More Protection for Trademark Parody, 13 Fordham Intell. Prop. ,  Media & Ent. L.J. 
1053, 1060 (2003) (concluding that "(p]arody is a form of expression that is clearly and 
staunchly protected by the First Amendment" (citation omitted)). 
1 15. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n. 18. 
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diocre writing and a work of great literature. A good deal of 
Chaucerian or Shakespearean language is, if presented as writ­
ten, indecent. 1 16 Yet, according to the Court, Shakespearian lan­
guage might not be relegated to the "safe harbor" period deemed 
appropriate for Carlin's monologue. 1 11 
Why not? After Pacifica, the difference turns on whether the 
FCC believes the play and its author are more worthy of family­
hour broadcast, on context as well as on language itself. 
Now, the suggestion that form has no effect on content is an 
interesting one, and it is one apparently with which many com­
mentators do not quarrel. But they should. The majority is limit­
ing its opinion to this case.1 18 And in this case, under these facts, 
the Court should have made a different decision, giving First 
Amendment protection to this speech. Satirists like Carlin rely on 
both form and content to deliver their message.11 9 If the Court 
limits First Amendment protection of the content, it also seriously 
limits the message. If it also limits protection of the form (through 
channeling, for example), it cripples that message even more se­
verely. In Carlin's case, ironically, the Court may have anointed 
him a more prescient First Amendment scholar than anyone 
could have predicted. Not only does the Court allow the FCC to 
prohibit the occasional "Jerry Garcia" adjectival use of exple­
tives 120 and the extended "Charlie Walker" content-based use of 
1 1 6. E.g. id. at 750 n. 29 (quoting "[a]nd prively he caughte hire by the queynte" from 
Geoffrey Chaucer's Miller's Tale, from The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer's Complete Works 
58 (Cambridge 1933)); infra n. 122 (discussing Shakespeare's phrase "the beast with two 
backs"). Thomas Bowdler made a career of excising objectionable passages from Shake· 
speare and other classics in order not to offend the sensibilities of a sensitive age. 4 Ency. 
Americana 362 (Grolier 2001). His name gave us the new verb, ''bowdlerize." Id. 
1 1 7. See id. at 750 (distinguishing the Carlin monologue from an Elizabethan comedy); 
id. at 733 (noting the FCC's claim that it intended only to "channel [this type of language] 
to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it" (citation omitted)). 
1 18. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (stating that the Court's review "is limited to the 
question whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular broad· 
cast") .  
1 1 9. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at  730 (stating that Carlin uses words to  satirize the con­
temporary views concerning the offensive nature of obscenities, exposing those views as 
"harmless" and "essentially silly''). 
120. See id. at 741 n. 1 6  (citing WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 4 1 2) .  In WUHY-FM, the 
FCC imposed liability upon a radio station for Jerry Garcia's repeated use of profanity on 
air. 24 F.C.C.2d at 409, 4 1 5. The Court concluded that "debate does not require that per­
sons being interviewed . . .  on talk programs have the right to . . .  use 'f-----g,' or 'mother 
f--- --g' as gratuitous adjectives throughout their speech. This fosters no debate, serves no 
social purpose, and would drastically curtail the usefulness of radio for millions of people." 
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suggestive material,121 but now, after Pacifica, it allows the FCC 
to channel the repeated use of "indecent language" to a more ap­
propriate hour, reasoning that it deserves less First Amendment 
protection than an Elizabethan comedy. 122 
Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall dissented in 
Pacifica. 123 Justice Brennan wrote the following: 
The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord proper 
weight to the interests of listeners who wish to hear broad­
casts the FCC deems offensive. It permits majoritarian 
tastes completely to preclude a protected message from en­
tering the homes of a receptive, unoffended minority. No de­
cision of this Court supports such a result. Where the indi­
viduals constituting the offended majority may freely choose 
to reject the material being offered, we have never found 
their privacy interests of such moment to warrant the sup­
pression of speech on privacy grounds.124 
At the time of the decision, court-watchers were split. Com­
mentator George Will applauded the majority for recognizing that 
Carlin's use of indecent language added nothing to his commen-
Id. at 415 (alterations in original). 
121. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 n. 16 (citing Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d at 
535 (discussing the use of indecent material in various mediums, such as radio, television, 
and magazines). In Robinson, the appellate court affirmed the FCC's decision not to renew 
the license of a radio station when the station manager attempted to mislead the FCC as 
to his knowledge of "vulgar and suggestive" comments made on-air by host Charlie 
Walker. 334 F.2d at 534-536. Note that the court's decision was specifically limited to the 
station manager's dishonesty. Id. at 536. 
122. See supra n. 1 17 and accompanying text (comparing Carlin to Shakespeare). Per­
haps the suggestion is that if the word is indecent but most of the audience is sufficiently 
ignorant to miss the meaning, the FCC will deem it acceptable. Note that Elizabethan 
comedies contain a great deal of raunchy language. Shakespeare is, after all, the man who 
invented the phrase "the beast with two backs." Eric Partridge, Shakespeare's Bawdy 144 
(3d ed., Routledge 1990) (explaining that the phrase, used in Othello, refers to the act of 
sexual intercourse). That much of the Bard's language goes over the heads of today's audi­
ences may be the reason that it could so easily get a family-hour-broadcast slot. 
123. See e.g. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778-780 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
legislative record does not support the majority's conclusion that "indecent" and "obscene" 
are distinct); id. at 762, 777 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); infra n. 124 and ac­
companying text (quoting Justice Brennan). 
124. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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tary. 125 Writer Nicholas von Hoffman objected that the decision 
"wasn't an intelligent one." 126 He pointed out that 
studies show that next to no children listen to any radio sta­
tion at that hour on a weekday for the reason that they are 
locked up in school taking sex[-]education courses where 
presumably Carlin's Anglo-Saxon terminology is replaced 
with Latin cognates on whose acceptability for broadcasting 
neither the commission nor our nine most exalted juris­
prudes have yet to rule. 127 
Just as the dissent does in Pacifica, a fair number of scholars 
have criticized the decision for various reasons. In his book The 
First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance, 128 Steven Shiffrin 
wrote that 
[m]ost people with any [F]irst [A]mendment bones in their 
bodies are troubled by the Pacifica case .... [The] case pro­
duces heat precisely because Carlin's speech is considered by 
many to be precisely what the first amendment is supposed 
to protect. Carlin is attacking conventions; assaulting the 
prescribed orthodoxy; mocking the stuffed shirts; Carlin is 
the prototypical dissenter. 129 
Professor Laurence Tribe commented that "the strangest 
thing about the Court's decision was that no one could reasonably 
suppose that children were listening to the radio station at 2 
o'clock in the afternoon."130 
125. George F. Will, Is There a 'Periphery' on the First Amendment? Wash. Post B7 
(July 9, 1978). 
1 26. Nicholas von Hoffman, Seven Dirty Words: A Cute Form of Censorship, Wash. Post 
E3 (July 29, 1978). 
127. Id. 
128. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Harvard U. 
Press 1990). 
129. Id. at 80. 
1 30. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 937 (2d ed., Found. Press 1 988) 
(citations omitted). Tribe reasoned as follows: 
WBAI, the broadcast station involved, is listener-supported, carries no ads, does not 
play "top forty" records, and directs its programming at a distinctly adult, left-to 
radical, upper-middle-class audience. In addition, studies show that virtually no 
children listen to any radio station whatsoever at that time on a weekday for the 
reason that most children are then in school. Nor is it probable that any significant 
number of adults were offended by Carlin's monologue. Certainly WBAI's regular lis­
teners were unlikely to be scandalized; in any case, the station prefaced the broad-
928 Stetson Law Review [Vol. 37 
Anne Coughlin, a professor at the University of Virginia 
School of Law, echoed Carlin's point with regard to the discussion 
of pornography and raised another point even more directly as 
follows: 
Id. 
How do scholars speak about that of which it is forbidden to 
speak? This question occupies a margin of the debate over 
the regulation of pornography since, whatever else it may be, 
pornography always has been unspeakable. Pornography is 
a way of representing sex that is enabled by and parasitical 
on cultural norms forbidding us to represent sex that way. 
Porn is delivered through many media, including art, pho­
tography, and cinematography, but it continues to find a 
home in prose too. Hence the dilemma for scholars and the 
critical question for this [e]ssay: with what language and 
through which methods may we present the forbidden with­
out representing it?l31 
cast with warnings of the sensitive language to come. That left at risk the radio lis­
teners who, turning the dials, stumbled briefly onto the offensive program. The 
number of such accidents had to be miniscule, much smaller than the number of 
WBAI listeners who enjoyed Mr. Carlin's satire. Indeed, the record showed that only 
one person complained-an unidentified citizen who, while driving in his car with 
his son, tuned into WBAI, heard Carlin's monologue, and apparently chose to turn 
no further. Given the facts, that the Court did not hold the FCC's order unconstitu­
tional suggests something else was afoot. 
131 .  Anne Coughlin, Representing the Forbidden, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 2 143, 2 143 (2002) 
(citations omitted). Since the Court's 2002 decision in Ashcroft, which held that a law regu­
lating virtual child pornography was overbroad and unconstitutional, one way to "present 
the forbidden without representing it" is by virtual recreation. Id. at 2143 (citing Ashcroft 
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)). In Ashcroft, the Court examined the Child 
Pornography Act of 1996, which attempted to limit a form of pornography that was neither 
obscene nor child pornography under the Court's existing caselaw. 535 U.S. at 239; see also 
Miller v. Cal. ,  413  U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (summarizing the obscenity standard); N. Y. v. Ferber, 
458 U.S. 747, 756-766 (1 982) (describing the child-pornography standard) . The Ashcroft 
Court noted that the Act prohibited not only computer-generated images of children engag­
ing in sexual acts but also "images that appear to depict a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit activity(,)" which would chill speech that is rich in literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value. 535 U.S. at 246. The law prohibited speech that recorded no crime or cre­
ated any victims in its production. Id. at 250. Thus, in some situations, the First Amend­
ment protects artificial pornography to a greater extent than it does real pornography. 
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V AFTER PACIFICA 
Let us move from the Pacifica decision, which incorporates 
the determination that the public airwaves are a public trust132 
and that "indecent words," whatever those words might be, when 
spoken in the middle of the afternoon constitute a nuisance133 
should be channeled to a more appropriate hour. Let us assume 
this is true because those "indecent words" came into the home 
and imposed on unwitting and unprepared listeners, and there 
was nothing in the listeners' powers to prevent the "indecent 
words" from reaching them.134 
Even if all of this is true, the subsequent history of the inde­
cency rationale suggests that, with the development of technol­
ogy, the changes in attitudes towards speech, and the FCC's ap­
parent inability to apply the indecency standard uniformly, the 
time has come for the Court to re-examine and perhaps abandon 
Pacifica. 
Once the Court handed down its opinion in Pacifica, the FCC 
seemed to consider carefully its next move. The Pacifica Court, by 
explicitly discussing the narrowness of its holding and emphasiz­
ing that "a host of variables" (including time of day, program con­
tent, and transmission medium) play into a nuisance determina­
tion, 135 indirectly cautioned the FCC to apply Pacifica with care. 
For many years, the agency did so. 136 The FCC (and its licensees 
as well) seemed to understand that the decision meant the words 
that Carlin identified were indeed the words one could not say on 
132 .  See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1 984) (reasoning 
that "given spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a 
sense as fiduciaries for the public"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 (holding that ''broadcast 
frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized 
only by the Government"); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and 
Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 Mich. Tele­
commun. & Tech. L. Rev. 285 (2004) (discussing the need to apply the public-trust doctrine 
to the electromagnetic spectrum to guarantee its efficient use). 
133. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (noting that "the [FCC's] decision rested entirely on a 
nuisance rationale"). 
134. See supra n. 1 08 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of a listener to 
erase what has been heard). 
135.  Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. 
136. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1486 (enforcing the rule based on a conservative 
reading of the Pacifica holding). 
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radio or television. 137 For the next decade or so, the agency, under 
the leadership of Reagan-appointee Mark Fowler, moved slug­
gishly against licensees despite the regular receipt of indecency 
complaints. 138 
By the mid- 1 980s, however, a number of lobbying groups, dis­
satisfied with the Reagan administration's agenda as it pertained 
to indecency, moved to ratchet up the attack, and by 1987, the 
FCC had issued rulings against several licensees. 139 For years the 
unstated assumption had been that "only material that closely 
resembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy the inde­
cency [standard] . . . .  "140 Broadcasters may not have liked the 
standard Pacifica created, but at least they had figured out its 
p arameters; now, those parameters seemed to be changing as the 
FCC undertook a much more aggressive stance on indecency. But 
since the Court had expressly cautioned against such an expan­
sive definition of indecency, 141 the question became whether the 
FCC's newest actions could pass constitutional muster.142 By 
1 987, the National Association of Broadcasters had requested 
137. Id. (conservatively reading that the "seven dirty words" could not be spoken before 
1 0:00 p.m. and that "indecency" was not broader than these "seven dirty words"). 
138. Id. at 1486-1487 (referring to the ''hands-off regulation" fostered by appointee 
Mark Fowler, who did not want to involve the FCC in any kind of broadcast-content regu­
lation); see also John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of 
the New FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 329, 329-337 (1989) (dis­
cussing the history of the indecency regime). 
139. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1488. After the FCC and Fowler received a lot of 
pressure from conservative groups like the National Decency Forum and Morality in Me­
dia, the FCC brought three indecency actions within a matter of four months. Id. 
140. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. ,  3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 (1987). 
141.  Pacifica, 428 U.S. at 743. 
142. The Court examined the FCC's actions more thoroughly as follows: 
It is true that the Commission's order may lead some broadcasters to censor them­
selves. At most, however, the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only 
the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and 
activities. While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the pe­
riphery of First Amendment concern. The danger dismissed so summarily in Red 
Lion, in contrast, was that broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regu­
lations by refusing to present programs dealing with important social and political 
controversies. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to 
situations not before the Court is "strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and only 
as a last resort." We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of pat­
ently offensive sexual and excretory speech. 
Pacifica 428 U.S. at 743 (quoting Broadrick u. Okla., 413  U.S. 601, 613 (1973)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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clarification, 143 and the FCC officially established a "safe harbor" 
period during which indecent material could be broadcasted (this 
period generally ran from midnight to 6:00 a.m.). 144 A flurry of 
litigation followed; 145 it did not end until the District of Columbia 
Circuit accepted the "support for parental supervision of children" 
and the "concern for children's well-being" rationales as sufficient 
to allow Congress to narrowly limit lic.ensees' broadcasting of in­
decent material in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 146 the 
third of the so-called "ACT" cases. 147 Important in the District of 
Columbia Circuit's decision were studies showing that a substan­
tially smaller number of children were in the audience after mid­
night as opposed to during the daytime hours, 148 and the fact that 
adults, although burdened by the restrictions, could either stay 
up late or find an alternative source to satisfy their tastes (per­
haps by renting a video) . 149 
The majority examined an exception to Congress's promul­
gated rule in the case, Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunica­
tions Act of 1992, 150 and pointed out that while commercial broad-
143. In re Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 93 1-933 (requesting clarification of the phrase "con­
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium," and of the term "patently 
offensive," as these terms are used in the definition of indecency). 
144. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 1 1  F.3d 1 70, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1 993), vacated, 15 
F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1 994). 
145. See id. (discussing the FCC's broader enforcement by the establishment of a safe 
harbor from midnight to 6:00 a.m. and broadening the term to indecency rather than just 
"filthy words"). 
146. Action for Children 's TV v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C.  Cir. 1995). 
147. Id. at 660. 
1 48.  Id. at 665. The court noted the following: 
It is apparent, then, that of the approximately 20.2 million teenagers and 36.3 mil­
lion children under [the age of twelve] in the United States, a significant percentage 
watch broadcast television or listen to radio from as early as 6:00 a.m. to as late as 
1 1  :30 p.m. ;  and in the case of teenagers, even later. We conclude that there is a rea­
sonable risk that large numbers of children would be exposed to any indecent mate­
rial broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and midnight. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
149. Id. at 666. In concluding that the FCC regulations have taken into account the 
First Amendment rights of adults wishing to view or listen to "indecent broadcasts" rele­
gated to the midnight-to-6:00 a.m. timeslot, the Court stated that 
[w]hile the numbers of adults watching television and listening to the radio after 
midnight are admittedly small, they are not insignificant. Furthermore, as we have 
noted above, adults have alternative means of satisfying their interest in indecent 
material at other hours in ways that pose no risk to minors. 
Id. 
150. The Public Telecommunications Act is available at Title 47 of the United States 
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casters could broadcast indecent materials only between the 
hours of midnight and 6:00 a.m., public broadcasters were permit­
ted to broadcast the same indecent materials from 10:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m.151  After noting there was no compelling interest for ad­
vancing such a distinction, the Court found the Act was unconsti­
tutional to the extent it prohibited the broadcasting of indecent 
speech between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.152 Thus, 
the safe harbor reverted to the current 10:00 p.m.-to-6:00 a.m. 
period. 153 
The decision resulted in a passionate dissent from Judge Ed­
wards, who pointed out that if indecency is truly harmful to chil­
dren, perhaps the Court would have been better off focusing its 
efforts on cable operators, who the judge called "the real culprits" 
as opposed to the broadcasters. 154 
Judge Edwards noted the availability of filtering technol­
ogy, 155 a point which Pacifica had made in its brief to the Supreme 
Court in 1978. 156 Filtering technology might not have been a pow­
erful tool in 1 978, but by 1995 it was far more effective.157 In the 
1990s, moreover, content-advisory systems began appearing on 
television as broadcasters began signaling to viewers which pro-
Code. 
151.  Id. at 656. This original "exception" to the rnidnight-to-6:00 a.rn. rule permitted 
"public radio and television stations that go off the air at or before midnight to broadcast 
such materials after 10:00 p.m." Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 672 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The majority emphasized that traditional 
broadcast media is subject to more stringent regulation than cable media, stating that 
"[u]nlike cable subscribers, who are offered such options as 'pay-per-view' channels, broad­
cast audiences have no choice but to 'subscribe' to the entire output of traditional broad­
casters. Thus they are confronted without warning with offensive material." Id. at 660 
(majority). 
155. Id. at 683 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Judge Edwards noted that in the original 
FCC Enforcement Order, there was no discussion of alternative means of preventing chil­
dren from observing "indecent broadcasts." Id. at 682. However, Judge Edwards high­
lighted that "at oral argument, counsel for the FCC assured the court that blocking tech­
nology, in which a chip placed in television sets prevents certain shows from being trans­
mitted, is available." Id. at 683. Also, "[i]n the Alliance case heard on the same day as 
[Action for Children's TV], the Commission presented another alterative, a segregate-and­
scramble scheme of indecent programming on cable's leased access channels." Id. 
156. Br. for Respt. at 49, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
157. Id. 
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grams contained violence, objectionable language, or explicit sex­
ual content. 158 
Under the Clinton administration, the FCC pursued rela­
tively few indecency complaints except for the most egregious of­
fenses (not surprisingly, shock-jock Howard Stern was often the 
culprit in these cases) . 159 However, during the George H.W. Bush 
administration, those inclined to bring indecency complaints 
found that they met with a far more sympathetic FCC. Beginning 
with an incident at a movie awards show, the FCC signaled that 
it once again wished to expand its definition of indecency beyond 
Carlin's seven dirty words all the way to single uses of objection­
able language. In other words, it was now cracking down on acci­
dental uses of profanity on the airwaves, those slip-ups known as 
"fleeting expletives."160 
The trouble began at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, where 
musician Bono took the stage and said "this is really, really, fuck­
ing brilliant."161 NBC failed to prevent the speech from reaching 
the air. In response, the FCC issued its infamous Golden Globes 
order and began enforcing a strict rule that imposed monetary 
penalties on broadcasters who allowed a fleeting expletive to 
reach the airwaves.162 Although the FCC Enforcement Bureau 
ruled that Bono's use of "fuck" was not indecent, the FCC re-
1 58. Jim Abbott, When Will Shows Carry Rating Labels? Orlando Sentinel A6 (Dec. 9, 
1996). Because of "pressure from Congress, President Clinton and the Federal Communi­
cations Commission, the [television] industry began devising the voluntary system in 
February [ 1 996] ." Id. 
1 59. See Infinity Broadcasting Pays $1 Million as Part of Settlement Resolving Inde­
cency Complaints, 1995 FCC LEXIS 7304 (Nov. 8, 1995) (discussing the indecent pro­
gramming on "The Howard Stern Show"). 
160. Fox TV Stations, 489 F.3d at 446-447. 
161 .  Id. at 451.  A complaint was filed with the FCC by the Parents Television Council 
arguing "the material was obscene and indecent under FCC regulations." Id. According to 
its Web site, the Parents Television Council's mission statement is 
to promote and restore responsibility and decency to the entertainment industry in 
answer to America's demand for positive, family-oriented television programming. 
The PTC does this by fostering changes in TV programming to make the early hours 
of prime time family-friendly and suitable for viewers of all ages. 
Parents Television Council, Frequently Asked Questions, "What Is the PTC's Mission?" 
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/faqs/main.asp#What%20is%20the%20PTCs%20mission (ac­
cessed June 13,  2008). 
162. Fox, 489 F.3d at 452. The court explained that "NBC, along with several other 
parties including Fox, filed petitions for reconsideration of the Golden Globes order, raising 
statutory and constitutional challenges to the new policy." Id. However, "[t]hese petitions 
have been pending for more than two years without any action by the FCC." Id. 
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versed not only the Bureau, but also its own long-established pol­
icy. The agency cast its net all the way back to a 1931 ruling, 
Duncan v. United States, 163 to find precedent. 164 It also dredged 
up another appellate court decision, Tallman v. United States, 165 
which, frankly, does not seem to apply. 166 In any event, broad­
casters were thereafter on notice167 that fleeting and isolated use 
of an expletive (in other words, rather than repeated and inten­
tional use of the kind seen in Carlin's monologue) was sufficient 
for the agency to impose sanctions. 168 
The tension between the FCC's restraint after Pacifica and 
its newly formulated policy on fleeting expletives came to a head 
shortly after the Golden Globes order was issued, and it was not 
well-received. In Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 169 the Second 
Circuit found a strange anomaly in the FCC's application of its 
new policy. While the FCC would impose a sanction on an enter­
tainer who used an expletive fleetingly at an awards ceremony, 170 
a news program in which an interviewee uttered an expletive, 171 
or a station that broadcasts a movie with the expletives intact, 
would not be sanctioned. 172 That inconsistency proved to be a ma­
jor problem. 
163. 48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931). 
164. See id. at 134 (holding that the defendant had used the word "damned" and had 
used the expression "by God" on the radio and that this speech was profane, though not 
indecent). 
165. 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972). 
166. See id. at 287 (upholding the conviction of petitioner, who was tried for broadcast­
ing obscenities under Title 18, Section 1464 of the United States Code and appealed that 
conviction). The petitioner claimed the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the 
meaning of "indecent" and "profane[,]" but the appellate court found no error for failure to 
instruct the jury on the meaning of these words because the case was tried solely as an 
obscenity case. Id. at 286. 
167. The FCC decided not to sanction NBC for the incident because it "necessarily did 
not have the requisite notice to j ustify a penalty[,]" further illustrating the abrupt policy 
change this decision brought. Fox, 489 F.3d at 452. 
168. Id. at 447. 
169. 489 F.3d 444. 
170. Id. at 455-456. The court noted that "there is no question that the FCC has 
changed its policy. As outlined in detail above, prior to the Golden Globes decision the FCC 
had consistently taken the view that isolated, non-literal, fleeting expletives did not run 
afoul of its indecency regime." Id. at 455. 
171.  Id. at 458. 
172. Id. at 45�459. The FCC relied on the "first blow" theory detailed in the Supreme 
Court's Pacifica case when rationalizing their recent attack on "fleeting expletives." Id. at 
457. In that case, the Supreme Court supported the FCC's regulation of broadcast media 
because such material enters "the privacy of the home uninvited and without warning." Id. 
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Fox arose after the FCC issued its 2006 Omnibus Order, 
which concluded that several television broadcasts were indecent 
and profane. 173 These broadcasts included the following: 
• A 2002 Fox broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards in 
which Cher stated, "People have been telling me I'm on the 
way out every year, right? So fuck 'em."174 
• A 2003 Fox broadcast of the Billboard Music Awards in 
which Nicole Richie, one of the presenters on the show, 
stated, "Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada 
purse? It's not so fucking simple."175 
• Various episodes of ABC's NYPD Blue in which characters 
used expletives including ''bullshit," "dick," and "dick­
head." 1 76 
• An episode of CBS's The Early Show, in which an inter­
viewee, a contestant on the hit reality show Survivor, re­
ferred to a fellow contestant as a ''bullshitter."177 
In the Omnibus Order, the FCC cited Golden Globes for the prin­
ciple that expletives need not be repeated for a finding of inde­
cency. 178 Prior to the court's decision in Fox, the FCC issued a re-
The Supreme Court "rejected the argument that the audience could simply tune-out: 'To 
say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent 
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."' 
Id. at 457-458. The present court, however, rej ected this argument as support for the 
recent change in FCC policy, noting that "the 'first blow' theory bears no rational connec­
tion to the Commission's actual policy regarding fleeting expletives." Id. at 458. 
1 73. Id. at 452 (discussing Compls. regarding Various TV Broads. between Feb. 2, 2002 
and Mar. 8, 2005, 2 1  F.C.C.R 2664 (2006), the case which issued the order). Through that 
Omnibus Order, "the FCC intended to 'provide substantial guidance to broadcasters and 




1 76. Id. 
177. Id. The court explained that "[i]n finding these programs indecent and profane, the 
FCC reaffirmed its decision in Golden Globes that any use of the word 'fuck' is presump· 
tively indecent and profane. The Commission then concluded that any use of the word 
'shit' was also presumptively indecent and profane." Id. (citations omitted). 
178. Id. at 453. The court discussed the prior filings of Fox, CBS, and ABC, explaining 
that "Fox and CBS filed a petition for review of the Omnibus Order in this court (the Sec· 
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mand order, 179 reversing parts of its Omnibus Order as it applied 
to The Early Show because it occurred in the context of a "bona 
fide news interview."180 The broadcasters contended that the FCC 
had made a 180-degree turn regarding its treatment of "fleeting 
expletives" and had done so without any explanation whatso­
ever. 181 
The Second Circuit began by noting that it was evident that 
the FCC had drastically changed its policy in regards to "fleeting 
expletives"; 182 after all, from the time of Pacifica until the period 
before Golden Globes, the agency had consistently found that 
fleeting expletives did not violate indecency standards. 183 The 
agency did an about-face in Golden Globes, announcing it would 
no longer follow its past policies regarding fleeting expletives. 184 
The Second Circuit pointed out that this kind of impromptu 
change in policy does not pass administrative muster because it 
did not provide a reasoned analysis explaining the change. 185 The 
FCC had failed to inform licensees of the new policy in advance 
ond Circuit). ABC filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, which was then trans· 
ferred to this court and consolidated with the petition for review filed by Fox and CBS." Id. 
1 79. Id. The Supreme Court, "[o]n September 7, 2006, . . .  granted the FCC's request for 
remand and stayed the enforcement of the Omnibus Order. The Commission was given 
sixty days to issue a final or appealable order, at which time the pending appeal would be 
automatically reinstated.'" Id. 
180. Id. at 454 (emphasis in original). The ruling against NYPD Blue was also dis· 
missed because the complainant watched the program in a region where the show was 
broadcast within the "safe harbor'" period after 10 p.m. Id. at 453 n. 5. The FCC, in the 
Remand Order, '"reaffirmed its finding that the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Award 
programs were indecent and profane.'' Id. at 453. 
1 8 1 .  Id. at 454. Other arguments against the FCC Remand Order included the follow· 
ing: 
(2) The FCC's '"community standards� analysis is arbitrary and meaningless; (3) The 
FCC"s indecency findings are invalid because the Commission made no finding of 
scienter; (4) the FCC"s definition of "profane" is contrary to law; (5) the FCC's inde· 
cency regime is unconstitutionally vague; (6) the FCC's indecency test permits the 
Commission to make subjective determinations about the quality of speech in viola­
tion of the First Amendment; and (7) the FCC's indecency regime is an impermissi· 
hie content-based regulation of speech that violates the First Amendment. 
Id. The court agreed with the first argument, and as a result did not address any of the 
other arguments. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 455. The court lists several FCC rulings supporting the previous "fleeting 
expletives" policy. Id. 
184.  Id. at 456. 
1 8il.  Id. nt 462. Agencies, like the FCC, '"are of course free to revise their rules and 
policie11. Such a change, however, must provide a reasoned analysis for departing from 
prior precedent." Id. nt 456 (citations omitted). 
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and with sufficient specificity so that they could understand the 
policy.186 
In dicta, the Second Circuit pointed out that the subjective 
nature of the policy probably would not pass constitutional mus­
ter. 187 For example, the Academy-Award winning Saving Private 
Ryan, riddled with expletives, garnered complaints from viewers 
when ABC ran it in 2004.188 The FCC found the expletives so nec­
essary and essential to the film (it claimed that deleting the ex­
pletives "would have altered the nature of the artistic work and 
diminished the power, realism [,] and immediacy of the film ex­
perience for viewers") that it declined to sanction ABC for the 
broadcast. 189 Yet occasional or singular expletives spoken in other 
shows were not so protected. The Second Circuit pronounced itself 
mystified by this contradiction. 19° This kind of subjective analysis 
on the part of the FCC was what gave rise to George Carlin's 
monologue back in the 1 970s. 
Consider the way expletives were used in Saving Private 
Ryan. When the soldiers in the movie cursed, they did not intend 
in any sense to give the words any literal meaning or provide any 
description of sexual or excretory activities. Rather, they used the 
expletives as Jerry Garcia once did191 and as Bono did at the 
Golden Globe Awards . 192 Even President Bush once used an ex­
pletive "in a manner that no reasonable person would believe ref­
erenced 'sexual or excretory organs or activities."193 
1 86. For more on the Second Circuit's rejection of the FCC policy, see Christine A. Cor­
cos, Small Curses, Big Problems, 30 Leg. Times No. 29 (July 16, 2007). 
1 87 .  Fox, 489 F.3d at 462. 
188. In re Compls. against Various TV Licensees regarding Their Broad. on Nov. 11 ,  
2004, of the ABC TV Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving Private Ryan", 20 F.C.C.R. 
4507, 45 1 2-45 13 (2005). 
1 89. Id. at 4 5 1 2-45 1 3. 
190. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462. On March 1 7, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
the case. John Eggerton, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Fleeting-Profanity Case, Broad­
casting Cable, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA54 1 006.html (Mar. 1 7, 2008). 
1 9 1 .  Supra nn. 22-27 and accompanying text. 
1 92. Fox, 489 F.3d at 4 5 1 .  
1 93. Id. at 459. During a discussion with a former British Prime Minister a t  a Group of 
Eight Summit in 2006, President Bush remarked that "the United Nations needed to 'get 
Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit[.]'" Id. An open microphone caught his lin­
guistic faux pas. Brooks Boliek, Bush Slip-up Trips up Indecency Law, Hollywood Reporter 
(July 1 8, 2006). 
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Would a serious commentary on the Elizabethan comedy dis­
cussed in Pacifica, 194 broadcast over the licensed airwaves earn an 
FCC sanction under the "fleeting expletives" regime? Certainly, a 
licensee might think twice about broadcasting such a documen­
tary or a documentary that traced the evolution of the meanings 
of bawdy words-for example, those words used in that Elizabe­
than comedy-even though its intent might be to educate the pub­
lic on changing meanings. Perhaps such a licensee might prefer to 
keep such documentaries unaired, and the audience in ignorance. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When George Carlin created his famous monologue, he did so 
not only to poke fun at the FCC but also to force us to consider 
why we react as we do to certain words. He delivered his mono­
logue to a live audience, not over the airwaves, but he intended 
his comments not just for governmental officials but for those who 
appoint them and for those who elect those who appoint them. 
Indecent and offensive language was with us in 1 973, in 1 978, 
and it is with us now. If one objects to it, the reaction to it can be 
to use the tools now available at one's disposal, including those 
that were not available in 1 978 (or at least not readily available), 
such as effective filtering technology, V-Chips, and ratings sys­
tems. These tools put more power in the hands of the adults who 
may not want their impressionable children hearing indecent 
language or content; at the same time, these tools also allow will­
ing adults to hear that language or content. 195 Thus, viewers who 
consistently object to radio or television content can force broad­
casters to change that content without turning to the FCC or to 
the courts. 196 
194. 438 U.S. at 750. 
195. Fox, 489 F. 3d at 465-466. 
196. See Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1501 (discussing the case of Terri Rakolta, 
who successfully objected to an episode of the Fox comedy series Married with Children 
and obtained the withdrawal of one advertiser). In some cases, TV itself parodies this 
process. In the episode "But First a Word from Our Sponsor" (first broadcast March 19, 
1990) of the CBS comedy series Murphy Brown, news reporter Murphy Brown confronts an 
advertiser whom she fears is ready to pull out of sponsoring the program FYI because of 
controversial material (sex education for children) and opposition from a parents' lobbying 
group. Murphy Brown, "But First a Word from Our Sponsor" (CBS March 19, 1990) (TV 
series). She discovers that the sponsor regards support for the program as nothing more 
than a good business decision. Id. 
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The Don Imus case can be illustrative here. 197 As you might 
recall, Imus was the controversial radio host who was fired from 
CBS Radio and MSNBC after referring to members of the Rutgers 
University women's basketball team in a derogatory manner in 
2007. 198 Listeners who dislike speech because they consider it in­
decent or objectionable can "vote with their ears" by turning off 
their radios or their televisions and by boycotting advertisers who 
sponsor the programming. Imus lost several major sponsors in the 
wake of his remarks about the women's team.199 In the wake of 
the Imus incident, some artists in other entertainment fields that 
were known for using the kind of language Imus was criticized for 
using eventually were forced into abjuring it.200 Public disap­
proval and threats of a severe drop-off in sales pushed media 
magnates like Russell Simmons to join the bandwagon of those 
demanding that hip-hop and rap artists downplay or abandon 
lyrics that emphasize violence and gender discrimination. 201 The 
following illustrated this change: 
On Monday hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons, who just two 
weeks ago was arguing for the rights of rappers to express 
themselves as artists, did a seeming about-face and called 
for the voluntary banning of ''bitch," ''ho[,]" and the N-word 
from the lexicon as "extreme curse words." He called for a 
coalition of industry executives to "recommend guidelines for 
lyrical and visual standards."202 
Unlike George Carlin, whose monologue resulted in a Su­
preme Court decision that to this day forces licensees to channel 
indecent speech into "safe harbor" periods, Imus did not leave the 
197. Teresa Wiltz & Darragh Johnson, The Imus Test: Rap Lyrics Undergo Examina­
tion, Wash. Post C l  (April 25, 2007). 
198. Sarah McBride, Imus Signs Deal with Citadel to Return to Radio, Wall St. J. B4 
(Nov. 2, 2007). 
199. Id. (discussing how advertisers dropped both the radio and television shows). 
200. See Wiltz & Johnson, supra n. 1 97 (explaining how the use of this language is 
becoming less accepted). 
201. Id. 
202. Id. Whether the criticism from people such as Al Sharpton really had more impact 
than criticism from within CBS and MSNBC is, perhaps, open to question. See AP, Imus' 
Settlement Means He Could Return to Air, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20263533/ (up­
dated Aug. 14, 2007) (referring to Sharpton's protests); but see McBride, supra n. 1 98 (dis­
cussing Sharpton's new view that he is ready to see Imus back on the air, as long as Imus 
is essentially controlled). 
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air because the FCC ruled his words were a nuisance. He left be­
cause the outcries from the public essentially forced management 
into firing him.203 
As a mature society, we can and must come to terms with our 
notions about offensive speech because it has not and will not go 
away. We confront it in the public square,204 on the Internet,205 on 
CDs, on DVDs, on premium cable,206 in theaters, and on movie 
screens, where apart from obscenity laws the government cur­
rently does not restrict it. 207 People like Lenny Bruce, Richard 
Pryor, Dave Chappelle, George Carlin, and Don Imus force us to 
face our fear of words and the ideas they represent. 
In 1973, George Carlin, high school drop-out and constitu­
tional law scholar, told us, apparently correctly, that he had de­
termined the seven words that no one was allowed to utter on the 
public airwaves. Thirty-five years later, he may still be correct.208 
To paraphrase what Winston Churchill said in another context, 
we may have not yet seen what has become, in the Author's opin­
ion, an ill-advised indecency rationale. We may not even have 
seen the beginning of the end. But we may, perhaps, have seen 
the end of the beginning.209 
203. See Wiltz & Johnson, supra n. 197 (noting that Sharpton called for Imus' ouster). 
204. See generally Cohen v. Cal. , 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that a state could not 
make a public display of a four-letter expletive a criminal offense). 
205. See generally ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that content·based blan· 
ket restrictions on speech on the Internet violated the protections of the First Amend· 
ment). 
206. Recently, some in Congress and at the FCC have indicated they will try to invoke 
the 70170 rule in order to extend indecency rules to hitherto unregulated cable. See 
Stephen Labaton, F. C. C. Chief Seeks Votes to Tighten Cable Rules, N.Y. Times Cl (Nov. 
26, 2007) (noting that the FCC is having a difficult time garnering enough support to in· 
voke the 70170 rule) . The 70/70 rule means that "the agency may adopt rules necessary to 
promote 'diversity of information sources' once the [C]ommission concludes that cable 
television is available to at least seventy percent of American households and at least 
seventy percent of those households actually subscribe to a cable service." Id.' 
207. See generally Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (establishing the Miller test to determine 
whether material is obscene). 
208. Several of the "seven words" would likely be deemed as either obscene or indecent 
Broadcasters can air the indecent ones on television between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.; the ob 
scene ones, however, are still forbidden. FCC, supra n. 6 1 .  
209. "Now this i s  not the end. I t  i s  not even the beginning of the end. But it i s  perhaps 
the end of the beginning." Churchill Ctr., Speeches and Quotes, "The End of the Begin 
ning", http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i 4a/pages/index.cfm ?pageid=388; (accessed June 
1 3, 2008); see also Christine A. Corcos, Small Curses, Big Problems, supra n. 186 (discuss· 
ing the FCC's thoughts on fining for the use of expletives). 
